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The phrase “political correctness,” a commonplace of public discourse, has a range of meanings.  Aside from its sneering use to derogate the political positions of opponents, the phrase usually applies to practices and policies which ideological liberals commend or condemn in educational institutions.  It applies to speech codes to censure or prohibit language which offends many people, especially racial, gender, or religious groups.  It applies to trigger warnings in course content or classroom discussion, safe zones for like-minded students to gather, and institutional policies for inviting or disinviting speakers.  These practices and policies, proposed or implemented, prompt controversies about the nature and purpose of institutions of higher education, with special attention to free speech, the unfettered exchange of ideas, and their converse, censorship.

These outward manifestations of political correctness on campuses have their inward manifestations in unreported episodes in departments, associations, and publications in the humanities.  Because they are difficult to detect or disclose, it is hard to know whether or to what degree peer pressure from PC colleagues deters some scholars from research, writing, or speaking which might elicit unpleasant personal or professional responses.  It is also hard to know whether political correctness is the cause of decisions to accept or reject submissions for publication.  If it is the cause, editors give no or other reasons for decisions, not those based on political correctness; and authors, if they suspected them, especially in cases of rejection, accept the decisions rather than register protests unlikely to prevail and likely to harm reputations or relationships.  Obviously, few affiliated scholars would make disclosures embarrassing to their profession or damaging to their careers.

As an independent scholar, I was free from departmental or professional pressures and able to research and write as I chose.  Most of my published work divides between the arcane issue of Shakespeare’s handwriting in the Sir Thomas More manuscript and the previously unexplored influence of the English chivalric romance tradition on his four major tragedies.  Readers and editors responded more or less reasonably to my submissions in these areas, despite my heterodox views.  But they reacted differently to my recent submissions on race because my views are not politically correct.  Of course, they did not admit as much, but their reticence in refusing explanation or evidence for their rejections was their admission.

In discussing two episodes from recent personal experience, I mean to show political correctness operating in publications in the humanities, not to litigate decisions to reject my submissions on race or to discomfit those with whom I differ.  However, I must detail those episodes to support inferences about editorial conduct and, from it, reader reports.  Denied explanations, I allow myself what courts allow: unfavorable inferences on the assumption that those accused would offer explanations or disclose evidence were they exculpatory, but not otherwise.

*  *  *

I did not come to the issue of race in Shakespeare; it came to me, thanks to Dr. Gail Kern Paster, then editor of the Shakespeare Quarterly (SQ).  Knowing my interest in Othello, she gave me a copy of the spring 2016 special issue on early modern race study and called attention to Ian Smith’s “We Are Othello: Speaking of Race in Early Modern Studies.”  I read it, the other six articles, and the editors’ introduction.  I was dismayed and said so to her.  She invited me to write a note to SQ’s website, and I did so:

Who Can Speak for Othello?

In “We Are Othello: Speaking of Race in Early Modern Studies,” in the special spring 2016 issue, Ian Smith compares Hamlet and Othello in the last moments of their lives: both want their stories rightly told.  His question—who speaks for Othello?—stimulates; his answer disappoints.  It deletes evidence opposing his thesis and discredits historical scholarship and its practitioners in early modern race studies.

Smith argues that Hamlet has Horatio to tell his story but Othello has no one to tell his.  Hamlet and Horatio share race, education, and background; Othello’s resume is unique.  However, Cassio, brother in arms, trusted friend, and confidant in courtship, is well positioned to tell Othello’s story.  In one erasure of contrary evidence, Smith never mentions Cassio.  In another, he reverses meaning by omitting relevant text.  Smith says, “Othello is … sensitive … to the perception of the black, racial stereotype of being ‘easily jealous’” (111).  In the full text, even if—to be proven—Othello recognizes the stereotype, he perceives himself as “one not easily jealous”—a statement showing him, ironically, speaking for himself and contradicting Smith speaking for him.

If Smith expects scholars to tell Othello’s story, he must expect them to tell it with insights from historical scholarship, perhaps the only scholarly basis for explaining Othello as he is in the play, neither excusing nor accusing him, as he requests.  But Smith impugns such scholarship and the motives of scholars who approach race in Shakespeare in that way.  “Fetishizing historical accuracy is to claim the high moral ground of sound scholarship, a position from which to disguise resistance to race work, from which to promote a singular perspective and methodology as acceptable while placing firm restrictions on others” (120).  Smith caricatures and sneers at “sound” scholarship but asserts no alternative.  Is it “unsound” scholarship?  Would it claim low moral ground?  How could white Shakespeare tell black Othello’s story, which, centuries later and cultures different, white scholars cannot tell as well as black ones?

Months later, Paster informed me of SQ’s rejection, gave no reason, and refused my request for one.  Instead, she gave me two reasons for her refusal: first, “I don’t think any reason I could give you would seem satisfactory to you”; second, “if I had, you would debate that reason.”  Given her invitation, her rejection was surprising, but her refusal to provide a reason was offensive.  She signals that it is untenable, unfair, unworthy; and shifts responsibility to me by making reactions which she imputes to me her excuse not to provide one.  I infer that her responses reflect insinuations or allegations of racism because I criticized a black scholar’s article, apprehensions about readers who would deem my letter racist and criticize SQ for publishing it, and intentions to spare a black scholar’s article from scholarly criticism.  The SQ board was unanimously indifferent to my concerns.

Perversely, SQ’s political correctness perpetuates racism by replicating it in another guise.  By limiting scholarly criticism of black scholars’ work, SQ  patronizes a prominent black scholar by protecting his work from criticism and uses a double standard in judging black and white scholars’ work.  Of course, judging work by different standards or treating authors in different ways because of race is racist.  In this episode, SQ’s political correctness hoists itself on its own petard.

This episode is an example, not a one-off instance.  Elsewhere in its special issue, SQ tolerated expressions of racial or religious prejudices by black scholars which it would not tolerate by white scholars.  The prejudices rest on two facts and a faulty inference: most scholars in English departments and of Shakespeare are white and have little interest in race study; ergo, most white scholars are racist, support or incline to racism, or avoid race out of insecurity about, or discomfort with, the topic.  First instance: Smith’s article.  Second instance: Guest editors Professors Peter Erickson (Northwestern) and Kim F. Hall (Barnard) impute to non-race scholars “a pathological averseness to thinking about race” (2).  This psychological imputation is offensive, and the existence of non-race scholars themselves black and not at all averse to thinking about race shows this fact-free assertion to be fatuous.  I have talked with some black scholars who have defiantly chosen not to be race scholars and have deliberately chosen to be “uncolored” scholars in areas of interest to themselves.

Third instance: Professor Arthur L. Little, Jr., (UCLA), in “Re-Historicizing Race, White Melancholia, and the Shakespearean Property” writes, “I’m not interested in an ad hominem reading of any Shakespeare scholar.”  Since no one “reads” a scholar for any other purpose, his denial prepares for his next word, “But” (86).  Little attacks Stephen Greenblatt’s criticisms of “claims of racial memory” and adduces his religion with anti-Semitic insinuation: “In one fashion or another, we are all, he seems [I stress this weasel word] to suggest, Jews” (87).  Little resorts to anti-Semitic smear to discredit a threat—Greenblatt differentiates who one is from what one studies—to make room for black privilege in scholarship; the affirmation of “racial memory” would warrant blacks’ special standing to interpret race-related matters.

Fourth instance: Graduate student Kyle Grady (Michigan), in “Othello, Colin Powell, and Post-Racial Anachronisms,” cites a well-known scholar of race Virginia Mason Vaughn’s comment that “I think this play [Othello] is racist, and I think it is not racist” (69n7) and interprets her ambiguity as “characteristic of regimes of racial intolerance”—a characteristic, though neither proven nor provable, which he does not pause to apply.  Vaughan’s verdict reflects a critical opinion of artistic indeterminism, her balance of evidence.  Grady’s unsupported indictment of her opinion and casual insinuation about her prejudice are gratuitous slurs typical of reverse racism in this special SQ issue.

By publishing these racist statements, SQ tacitly aligns itself with them and shows the special indulgence which the politically correct grant black scholars.  It patronizes black scholars by privileging them and their prejudices.  It gives them a “safe place” for their articles in a special issue.  Even so, its indulgence goes unrewarded.   These articles mark no notable advance in modern race study in Shakespeare, and their rhetoric is unlikely to make their views appealing to any but PC true believers.

My experience and these four instances suggest three problems.  One, political correctness discovers white racism wherever it detects ideological discordancy.  Two, it lacks a principled stance against racism by embedding racism in its double standards, thus tolerating black, but not white, racism, with a dash of anti-Semitism for good measure.  Three, it blinds adherents to the implications of their positions or practices—either or both sometimes racist.  Notwithstanding, SQ apparently thinks that publishing articles with underlying prejudices can advance support or respect for what the guest editors oxymoronically call a “politically engaged scholarship” (1).

*  *  *

Smith’s article prompted me to re-examine Othello and consider whether the play is about race.  To the politically correct, even considering the question smacks of racism.  In his SQ article, Smith reports that a coterie of black and white scholars in a 2012 Shakespeare Association of America (SAA) Othello seminar twice ignored a white scholar when he dissented from their consensus by declaring that “Othello is not about race.”  A seminar, not this caucus, might have probed the question of the centrality of race in the play and yielded useful insights, but these race scholars preferred to rebuff this challenge to today’s PC received opinion.

My re-examination resulted in a paper and an article which took this dissenter’s words as their title and as my answer to the question.  At the spring 2017 conference of the South Central Renaissance Conference (SCRC), I presented a well received paper—the two black male panelists agreed with it—in a seminar on race in the renaissance which I organized and Thomas Herron, Professor of English at East Carolina University, led.  Before I submitted a detailed, data-rich version to Explorations in Renaissance Culture, Herron, then its outgoing editor, reviewed it and offered suggestions for revision, none hinting at anything racist in my views or polemical in its tone.  He selected two readers for the final version, sent it to them for review, then left the decision to his successor, Andrew Fleck, Associate Professor of English at The University of Texas at El Paso.

Many months later, Fleck reported the rejection of my submission: “the consensus is that the essay should not be published in its current form.  I’m not sure whether you would find it helpful to receive readers’ reports on the essay. If you’d like to have more sense of those reports, I’d be happy to summarize them for you....if you’d like to reframe your essay on Othello and send it my way again, please do consider us.”  Three reasons make this rejection suspect.  One, the custom, known to readers and observed by most editors, is to send readers’ reports or a summary with editors’ decisions.  Fleck did neither.  Despite my requests and Herron’s advice, which he sought, he refused to send the reports.  Two, given the topic race and his resolute refusal, Fleck’s stated reason that the reports would not be “helpful” to me suggests that the reports are personal attacks or political condemnations insinuating or alleging racism.  I said so to Fleck; he did not deny my inference before he broke off communication.  Three, although uncomfortable reporting what the readers were comfortable writing, Fleck found it helpful to base his decision on reports which he refused to disclose.  I infer that he concurred with what the readers said, not how they said it, and that any revision of “form” would require deletion of content—in other words, censorship.

  In reply to my concern, SCRC’s President wrote that the Board would consider it at its next meeting.  A Board member with legal and academic training afterwards reported, “Andy Fleck assured the Board in no uncertain terms that the report responded to the academic and tonal merits of the argument in a highly courteous and professional way: more specifically, there was no allegation of racism brought against you on the part of the reader, nor did any suspicion of racism play into the editor's decision not to publish the piece.”  The writer did not reply to answer my doubts: how many reports did Fleck receive; why would any report(s) of that character not be “helpful” to me; why did he offer personal assurance, not direct evidence, to the Board; and why did he not provide such reports or offer such assurance to me.

Given peculiar conduct and discordant accounts, I infer that SCRC readers smeared my scholarly submission and me as politically incorrect because racist, and that Fleck accepted their smears and used them to reject it.  Their performance implies that political correctness, if questioned, can present readers and editors more political than scholarly with dilemmas and challenges which some neither overcome nor resolve.

*  *  *

These two episodes exemplify the nefarious nexus between the personal and the political, with one used to discredit the other.  The rationalization of the ideologically zealous is that ends justify means, or, as I realign the parameters, cause disregards character.  Accordingly, the politically correct use ad hominem remarks to attack, or defend themselves from, perceived opposition, with no sense of impaired uprightness.  These two attacks make insinuations or allegations—I am (unconsciously) racist and mishandle rejections—easy to assert, hard to prove, absent any facts.  I deny the attacks but do not socially position myself to deny them because social positioning gives tacit support to ad hominem responses—yet another problem of political correctness in scholarly publications in the humanities.

*  *  *

My thesis is that political correctness is the antithesis and antagonist of humanistic scholarship.  It cannot be otherwise.  When scholars select or reject evidence and construct arguments to reach PC conclusions, the result is doctrine.  When publications accept or reject submissions according to PC positions, the result is censorship.  This political correctness has harmed the humanities in classrooms, departments, fields, and journals for decades.  For it arose fifty years ago, when male students sought to avoid the Vietnam War draft with deferments to attend graduate schools, often in the humanities.  Their interests and motives were less scholarly than political or personal.  Themselves to justify, they adopted critical theories—in literature, movements like New Historicism—which re-oriented scholarship from pursuing truth in the humanities to exploiting them for political ends in matters of race, gender, class.  Political correctness has been one tool in converting the search for truth into a sophistry for reform.

The results have been deplorable.  Nobody and nothing have been well served by the policies or practices of political correctness, not students, not traditional scholars in the humanities, not colleges and universities trying to provide an education other than job training.  For only the humanities enable students to acquire or apply critical thinking to important social issues.  Critical thinking, or informed judgment, can be enhanced by the impartial study of all relevant data and ideas in the context of human experience.  Its best representation in different times, places, and cultures is literature.  Its study can help us to recognize, analyze, and appraise the variety, complexity, and dynamism of human experience.  Its study can help us manage the many, varied personal encounters in a world in which communication and transportation bring people with different backgrounds into contact as “other” to each other, and understand and respect them—the antithesis of racism, sexism, and classism.
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